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The End of Mystery 
Abstract  
Tim travels back in time and tries to kill his grandfather before his father was 
born. Tim fails. But why? Lewis’s response was to cite ‘coincidences’: Tim is 
the unlucky subject of gun jammings, banana peels, sudden changes of heart 
and so on. A number of challenges have been raised against Lewis’s response. 
The latest of these focuses on explanation. This paper diagnoses the source of 
this new disgruntlement and offers an alternative explanation for Tim’s failure, 
one that Lewis would not have liked. The explanation is an obvious one, but 
controversial and so it is defended against all the objections that can be 
mustered.  
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1. Introduction  
Tim the time traveler travels back in time, hell-bent on murdering his 
grandfather before his father was conceived. As we learnt at mother’s 
knee: Tim fails. But why? Lewis’s (1976) (in)famous response was to cite 
‘coincidences’: Tim is the unlucky subject of gun jammings, accidents 
with banana peels, sudden changes of heart and so on. A number of 
challenges have been raised against Lewis’s response. The latest of these 
focuses on explanation. In this paper we diagnose the source of this new 
disgruntlement and offer an alternative explanation for Tim’s failure—
one that Lewis would not have liked. Very roughly, Tim fails because 
contradictions are impossible. We think that the explanation is an obvious 
one, but controversial so we defend it against all of the objections we can 
muster. We begin, in § 1, with Tim’s tale along with Lewis’s account of 
it, and the perceived explanatory woes of that ac- count before, in § 2, 
diagnosing the source of these woes and offering an alternative 
explanation. In § 3 we consider objections.  
2. The Grandfather Paradox  
Why does Tim fail to kill his grandfather? According to Lewis (1976), 
Tim fails to kill his grandfather for some ‘commonplace’ reason. Tim’s 
gun might jam. Or he might slip on a banana peel. Or he might have a 
sudden change of heart. Or he might get distracted at the last minute or ... 
And so it goes. Call the explanation that Tim fails because of some 
commonplace reason: the Lewis explanation. The Lewis explanation for 
Tim’s failure has long worried philosophers. Resistance to the Lewis 
explanation comes in two forms. First, some deem the Lewis explanation 
to be unsatisfactory on probabilistic grounds (see Horwich (1987; 1975)). 
This concern, however, has been adequately answered (cf. Smith 1997). 
So set it aside. Second, some deem the Lewis explanation to be 
unsatisfactory on explanatory grounds. The Lewis explanation does not, 
some have argued, constitute a complete explanation; the case of Tim the 
time traveller remains mysterious. Arntzenius and Maudlin (2002, p. 180) 
express this sentiment when they write of Tim’s failed schemes to kill his 
grandfather:  
One worry is the question as to why such schemes always fail. Doesn’t 
the necessity of such failures put prima facie unusual and unexpected 
constraints on the actions of people, or objects, that have travelled in 
time? Don’t we have good reason to believe that there are no such 
constraints (in our world) and thus that there is no time travel (in our 
world)? [our emphasis]  
Smith (2017, p. 157) does a nice job of outlining the problem:  
The worry is as follows. The would-be autoinfanticidal time traveller is 
attempting to do something impossible ... We accept that she will not 
succeed. We also accept that what will stop her succeeding is a 
succession of commonplace occurrences ... We are bracketing any worry 
that such a succession is improbable ... Yet still there is a problem (so 
the worry goes). The problem is that the exclusion of the time traveller 
from successfully committing autoinfanticide seems mysteriously 
inexplicable. Each particular event that foils the time traveller is 
explicable in a perfectly ordinary way; but the inevitable combination of 
these events amounts to a ring-fencing of the forbidden zone of 
autoinfanticide—and this ring-fencing is mystifying. It’s like a grand 
conspiracy to stop the time traveller doing what she wants to do—and 
yet there are no conspirators: no time lords, no magical forces of logic. 
This is profoundly perplexing.  
Call the worry that Lewis’s explanation is incomplete: the explanation 
problem for backwards time travel. We will have more to say about 
Smith’s solution to the explanation problem in due course. For now, we 
wish to focus on the problem itself. As Smith shows, the explanation 
problem can be traced to the work of a number of Lewis’s critics. In 
addition to Arntzenius and Maudlin, Dowe (2007, p. 724), Gorovitz 
(1964, pp. 366–367), Horwich (1987, pp. 119–121), Riggs (1997, p. 52), 
Ismael (2003, p. 308) and Carroll (2010, p. 86) all consider some version 
of the explanation problem. The problem is compelling. Tim fails to kill 
his grandfather because his gun jams? Surely there’s more to the story 
than that!  
Such an explanation is unsatisfactory in three respects. First, the 
explanation is not particularly unified. Suppose Tim tries to kill his 
grandfather repeatedly. He fails but each time for a different reason: his 
gun jams, he is distracted at the last moment, he slips on a banana peel, he 
has a sudden change of heart. All of these events are utterly disparate. And 
yet the repeated failure is not as disjunctive as its explanation. Second, the 
explanans and the explanandum have very different modal profiles. There 
is something inevitable about Tim’s failure, but there is nothing inevitable 
about gun jammings, distractions and changes of heart. Such events could 
easily have been otherwise; but not so for Tim’s failure. Third, the Lewis 
explanation does not yield much by way of understanding. Sure, Tim fails 
because he slips on a banana peel, but merely citing this fact gives us no 
‘Aha!’ moment.1  
So the Lewis explanation leaves us with a sense of mystery. Shortly we 
will offer an alternative to the Lewis explanation or, rather, a supplement 
to it. First, how- ever, we believe that the explanatory structure of the 
grandfather paradox needs to be unpacked. It is imperative to distinguish 
three explananda that are apt to be conflated. Here they are:  
[EXP1] Tim fails to kill grandfather.  
[EXP2] All of Tim’s actual attempts result in failure.  
[EXP3] Tim is doomed to fail in his attempts to kill grandfather.2  
A bit about the difference between these two explananda: [EXP1] 
concerns a particular event in which Tim fails to kill his grandfather. So, 
for instance, suppose that on the 12th November 1955 at 2:00pm, Tim 
takes aim at his grandfather, pulls the trigger and fails to make his mark. 
Why? What exactly is it that happens on the 12th November 1955 at 
2:00pm? That’s the kind of question that [EXP1] raises. [EXP2] by 
contrast, are not about any event in particular. It is, rather, about the 
manner in which, no matter how hard he tries, Tim fails to kill his 
grandfather. All of his attempts are stymied. [EXP2], then, is about the 
sum-total of Tim’s failures; it is about Tim’s life story. Why, we might 
wonder, is Tim’s life so beset by defeat? What accounts for the string of 
fails? [EXP3] is about the possibility of what Tim is trying to do. [EXP3] 
is not just about Tim’s life story, but about any way that Tim’s life story 
might have gone. No matter how Tim might possibly try to kill 
grandfather, Tim must fail. What accounts for this modal fact?  
To highlight the difference between [EXP1], [EXP2] and [EXP3] it is 
useful to consider a different case altogether. In Königsberg there were 
once seven bridges connecting a series of islands. Suppose that Bridget 
attempts to cross all seven bridges, crossing over each bridge exactly 
once. She fails to do so. Suppose she tries again and again and she fails 
each time. Why? As with Tim the time traveler, there are two explananda 
that demand attention:   
[EXP4] Bridget fails to cross the Seven Bridges of Königsberg.  
[EXP5] Bridget fails to cross the Seven Bridges of Königsberg repeatedly.  
[EXP6] Bridget is doomed to fail in her attempts to cross the Seven 
Bridges of Königsberg.  
As with [EXP1], [EXP4] is about a particular event. So, for instance, 
suppose that on the 12th November 1755 at 2:00pm, Bridget attempts her 
crossing and is foiled. Why? What exactly is it that happens on the 12th 
November 1755 at 2:00pm? [EXP5] like [EXP2] is not about any event in 
particular. It is, rather, about the manner in which, no matter how hard she 
tries, Bridget fails to cross the Seven Bridges of Königsberg. [EXP4] is 
about Bridget’s bridge crossings taken together. Why is Bridget, like Tim, 
such an actual failure? That’s what we want to know. [EXP6] is about any 
possible attempt that Bridget might make. No matter how she actually 
tries to cross the seven bridges, any possible alternative will also meet 
with failure. Why? What accounts for the fact that she must fail, no matter 
what she tries to do?  
[EXP4], [EXP5] and [EXP6] call for different kinds of explanation. 
[EXP4] calls for a causal explanation: on the 12th November 1755 at 
2:00pm Bridget fails to cross the Seven Bridges because she becomes 
distracted and accidentally doubles-back over a bridge she forgot she had 
already crossed. [EXP5] calls for an explanation of the string of causal 
histories corresponding to Bridget’s attempts; it calls for an explanation 
that ties together these actual attempts under a common banner and 
explain why she always fails. [EXP6] calls for an explanation that 
abstracts away from the actual causal details entirely.  
The abstracted explanation for [EXP6] is mathematical in nature, and lies 
in graph theory. If we treat each of the seven bridges as an edge, and each 
of the land masses as vertices, the seven bridges can be treated as a 
connected graph. The resulting graph is non-Eulerian, which means that 
it provably lacks both an Eulerian path and an Eulerian circuit. An 
Eulerian path is just a continuous path through a graph that passes over 
each edge exactly once; an Eulerian circuit is a continuous path through a 
graph that passes over each edge exactly once, starting and ending at the 
same vertex. The lack of Eulerian paths explains [EXP6]: there just is no 
suc- cessful crossing available to Bridget so she must fail. The lack of 
Eulerian paths also explains [EXP5]: Bridget repeatedly fails to cross the 
seven bridges because there is no possible way of succeeding. And, of 
course, this impossibility also explains [EXP4].  
As with [EXP4], [EXP5] and [EXP6], [EXP1], [EXP2] and [EXP3] 
demand different kinds of explanation. [EXP1], like [EXP4] calls for a 
causal explanation: on the 12th November 1955 at 2:00pm, Tim fails to 
kill his grandfather because his gun jams. [EXP2], like [EXP5], calls for 
an explanation that sets aside any particular gun jammings, changes of 
heart and so on, and tells a general story about Tim’s actual failures. 
[EXP3], like [EXP6], requires an explanation that abstracts away from 
Tim’s actual attempts, either taken individually or together, and tells a 
general story about why, no matter how Tim tries, no matter what possible 
attempt he makes on grandfather’s life, he must fail.  
Before we outline the correct explanation for [EXP3], it is worth pausing 
to consider how conflating [EXP1], [EXP2] and [EXP3] might bring 
discomfort. Suppose one is perplexed about Tim the time traveler and 
asks: “Why does Tim fail to kill grandfather?” and we give back the 
answer: because Tim’s gun jams. In giving this answer, we have 
understood the question being asked to be a causal why-question. We took 
the question to be asking after [EXP1], and so we answered accordingly. 
If that’s what was really being asked, if all one wanted to know is what 
gets between Tim and homicide on a particular occasion, in the past, 
when Tim fails then one ought to be satisfied. The question was asked and 
answered. One has the explanatory goods, so to speak.  
If, however, one was really asking after [EXP2] or [EXP3], then the 
answer we have provided will seem utterly unsatisfying. Suppose one is 
asking after [EXP2]. What is sought is an explanation for why Tim 
repeatedly fails. We have explained why he fails on a particular occasion. 
That does nothing to explain the string of failures to which he succumbs. 
Similarly, suppose one is asking after [EXP3]. What is sought is an 
explanation for why Tim was doomed to fail. We offered the causal story 
about his failure. But that causal story does nothing to explain the 
inevitability of Tim’s failure. Indeed, when the explanation for [EXP1] is 
offered up as an explanation for either [EXP2] or [EXP3], that explanation 
should seem unsatisfactory in exactly the respects discussed above. An 
account of the causal history of a particular event does nothing to unify 
Tim’s various failures, and it is a unified account of why he always fails 
that one ultimately wants when asking after [EXP2]. Similarly, an account 
of the causal history of a particular event is out-of-step with the modal 
force of the ‘why’ question one is asking when asking after [EXP3]. It 
was the inevitability of Tim’s failure that was asked after. We responded 
with a contingent could-easily-have-been-otherwise causal story. No 
wonder the answer isn't mollifying. Finally, the causal story does little to 
help one understand [EXP2] or [EXP3]. To be sure, it helps one 
understand why Tim fails on a particular occasion, but no understanding 
of why he always fails or why he is doomed to fail has been given (apart 
from the conjunction of all the particular causal stories).  
The explanation problem arises, we contend, because the Lewis 
explanation answers at best one ‘why’ question. It answers a ‘why’ 
question posed at [EXP1]. But that why question is of little interest. It is 
[EXP2] and [EXP3] that really matter. The Lewis explanation can 
therefore seem unsatisfying in one of two important ways. First, one might 
mistakenly take the Lewis explanation to be an explanation for either 
[EXP2] or [EXP3], a task to which it is unsuited. Second, one might 
correctly take the Lewis explanation to be an explanation for [EXP1] but 
maintain—and we think rightly—that the important fact in need of 
explanation is [EXP3]. Again, we can look to the Seven Bridges of 
Königsberg for guidance. Exactly the same confusion would arise in that 
case if the causal explanation were mistakenly treated as an explanation 
for [EXP5] or [EXP6]. Imagine that someone claims to have solved the 
Bridges of Königsberg case once and for all. Why does Bridget repeatedly 
fail to cross the seven bridges? And why is she doomed to fail? For some 
commonplace reason, is the answer offered. She keeps doubling back over 
bridges, or losing her concentration. Once she even slipped on a banana 
peel and fell headlong into the canals. Such a common-place solution is 
clearly missing something. Euler and the graph theory explanation has it 
right. But if we didn’t have Euler to guide us, and we were confused about 
the particular explanatory question being asked, we might well think that 
there’s something to this common-place account.  
So what then is the explanation for [EXP3]? The answer is one that Lewis 
would not have liked: logic. Tim is doomed to fail in his attempts to kill 
grandfather because any successful attempt would result in a logical 
contradiction, and contradictions are impossible given the law of non-
contradiction. In short, just as mathematical facts are needed to explain 
why Bridget cannot complete the bridge walk, logical facts are needed to 
explain why Tim’s homicidal tendencies must go unfulfilled. Moreover, 
just as the mathematical explanation for [EXP6] also explains [EXP5], so 
too does the logical explanation for [EXP3] also explain [EXP2]. It is 
because Tim must fail that he fails in all of his attempts actually. The 
comparison with the mathematical case is no accident. In both cases, the 
explanation operates in a very similar fashion, via abstraction: the 
particular causal details of the scenario are set aside in order to focus on 
the broad structure of the two cases. In one situation, the structural facts 
most salient are mathematical ones, in the other case the facts are logical. 
In both cases, though, abstraction is necessary for the explanatory task at 
hand.3,4  
We say that Lewis would not like this explanation because he seems to 
rule it out. Here’s Lewis (1976, p. 149):  
Tim can kill Grandfather. He has what it takes. Conditions are perfect in 
every way: the best rifle money could buy, Grandfather an easy target 
only twenty yards away, not a breeze, door securely locked against 
intruders. Tim a good shot to begin with and now at the peak of training, 
and so on. What’s to stop him? The forces of logic will not stay his hand! 
No powerful chaperone stands by to defend the past from interference.  
To be clear: we are not suggesting that there is any logical chaperone.5 
But we do believe that, in a certain (non-causal) sense, the forces of logic 
stay Tim’s hand. It is because contradictions are impossible that Tim is 
doomed to failure. Of course we don’t mean that the law of non-
contradiction causes Tim to fail, and we don’t think that logic is a thing 
and that the thing gets in the way. Our claim is just that the best, 
systematic explanation for why Tim is doomed to fail in his attempts to 
kill grandfather is one that appeals to logical facts in the explanans.  
Our response is unpopular, it seems. Smith (2017) has, to some degree, 
argued against it, and we can muster a few objections against the response 
ourselves. Before addressing objections, however, it is useful to pause and 
consider the power of the logical explanation we are proposing. First, the 
logical explanation provides the sought-after unity that we described 
above. Tim’s various failures are unified in virtue of what they are 
attempts to do: they are all attempts to do something impossible. Second, 
the logical explanation is modally robust: why is Tim doomed to fail? 
Because success is impossible. The modal strength of the explanans and 
the explanandum are, finally, in accord. Third, the logical explanation 
yields understanding: once we learn that success would be impossible, we 
just get why Tim must fail whenever he tries: “Aha!”, we say, “but of 
course!”  
3. Objections  
As we said, there are objections.   
3.1. Nothing New!  
Here’s the first objection: what we have said is nothing new! Lewis’s 
account of Tim the time traveler appeals to consistency in a number of 
places. At best, then, we have simply restated Lewis’s position.  
Even if this is correct, we believe that the restatement is useful and 
important in two respects. First, we have offered a diagnosis of where the 
explanation problem goes wrong, and a solution to that problem. Maybe 
the solution and the diagnosis were already there in Lewis. If so, then the 
present paper can be considered as a timely reminder that there is a 
perfectly adequate explanation available for why it is that Tim is doomed 
to fail. Second, Lewis was clearly dubious about the idea that the laws of 
logic have a role to play in accounting for Tim’s failed attempts to kill his 
grandfather. So if the position we are defending is Lewis’s then a further 
puzzle arises: what’s Lewis playing at? Suppose he accepts that the 
correct explanation for Tim’s failure is a logical one, then why cast shade 
on the idea that logic has anything to do with it?  
The apparent tension in Lewis’s thought can be explained by looking to 
Lewis’s wider views about explanation. Lewis (1986) held the view that 
all explanation is causal. Accordingly, the only way that Lewis can see 
the laws of logic being explanatorily relevant is through the lens of causal 
reasoning. Through such a lens, the only way for the law of non-
contradiction to do explanatory work is for it some- how cause Tim the 
time traveler's repeated failure. This way of thinking about the 
explanatory power of the laws is bizarre indeed. The central move we are 
making then, and the move that we deem to be novel is to give up the 
shackles of a causal theory of explanation and see the time travel case in 
the simplest of terms. Tim is doomed to fail because the law of non-
contradiction is inviolable.6 That’s an explanation, and it is a non-causal 
one. So on the one hand we agree with Lewis: the laws of logic do not 
stay Tim’s hand, if ‘to stay’ is ‘to prevent causally’. But we disagree in so 
far as we think that Tim’s hand is stayed (in the relevant non-causal sense) 
by logic nonetheless; it is stayed because it must be, on pain of 
contradiction. And, of course, the specific means of staying his hand is 
via various common-place occurrences. The laws of logic work in concert 
with or, rather, via commonplace causal explanations.  
One might seek to press the ‘nothing new’ objection a bit further. In a 
recent paper, Smith (2017, pp. 161–162) takes a line that is quite similar 
to the one that we are taking.  
It should now be clear what to say about [the explanation problem]: it 
isn’t a sound one! This is a case of the type in which no (further) 
explanation of failure is required. There are no scenarios at all—no 
points in logical space—satisfying the description ‘a time traveler 
commits autoinfanticide’. There is no forbidden zone and hence, no need 
or even possibility of an explanation of why the time traveler does not 
enter ‘it’. Whatever happens it won’t be autoinfanticide because no 
scenario at all satisfies that description. The reason for this is that the 
description is self-contradictory ... So, the crucial point here is that there 
is no forbidden zone. This is completely different from saying that there 
is one, but ‘laws of logic’ prevent us from entering it... The key point is 
that the purported descriptions of scenarios in the forbidden zone 
(involving autoinfanticide—or indeed any successful changing of the 
past) are all self-contradictory and describe no sequence of events at all. 
Hence, there just is no forbidden zone and thus no mysterious ring-
fencing of ‘it’: there is nothing to ring-fence.  
In order to understand Smith’s response to the explanation problem, let’s 
consider Smith’s idea of ring fencing. Suppose that, all of a sudden, an 
invisible barrier appears around Smith’s office. No one can get in or out. 
The office is, as it were, ring-fenced by a mysterious force. This ring-
fencing stands in need of explanation. For it is clearly possible, in some 
broad sense, to get into the office. People have been in there before. All 
of a sudden, however, the possibility of entering the office is off-limits. 
This case differs sharply from the time-travel case. With respect to Smith 
and his office, there are points in logical space—namely ones where he is 
in his office—that are closed off. This corresponds to a ‘forbidden zone’ 
that Smith talks about in the quotation above. With respect to poor Tim 
and his travels through time, there are no points in logical space that are 
closed off. It is not possible for Tim to kill his grandfather. There just is 
no corresponding ‘forbidden zone’ of logical space.  
This difference between the two cases makes all the difference for Smith. 
When there is a forbidden zone, simply pointing to the ring-fence 
surrounding the forbidden zone does nothing to alleviate the mystery. If 
Smith asks “why can’t I get into my office?” and we say “because you 
can’t!” No steps have been taken toward alleviating the mystery at hand. 
When there is no forbidden zone, however, pointing to the absence of such 
a zone is enough to remove all mystery. This is how Smith sees the time 
travel case: when we point to the fact that what Tim is trying to is 
impossible, there is no-longer anything mysterious about the fact that Tim 
is doomed to fail in his attempts to kill grandfather. As Smith notes, 
pointing to the fact that there is no forbidden zone is quite different to 
pointing to a forbidden zone—some set of points in logical space that are 
closed off—and remarking that laws of logic keep us from reaching those 
points in logical space.  
But isn’t that what we’re saying? Not exactly. Our claim is not that there 
is some forbidden zone of points in logical space that the laws of logic 
keep us from entering. At least, not if what we mean by ‘points in logical 
space’ is ‘logical possibilities’. Our claim is that there are no logical 
possibilities in which Tim succeeds in killing grandfather, because the law 
of non-contradiction is true. If, however, what one means by ‘points in 
logical space’ is something much broader, something that al- lows the 
relevant points to be impossibilities then we are guilty as charged: there 
absolutely is a forbidden zone that the laws of logic prevent us from 
entering, and that forbidden zone is the zone of impossibility. But we see 
nothing untoward about the laws of logic cleaving the possible from the 
impossible, and we see no reason why one cannot appeal to the shape of 
that ring-fence—the precise divide between the possible and the 
impossible—in the course of offering an explanation.  
Ultimately, we are in agreement with Smith on the following crucial point: 
when we realize that what Tim is trying to do is impossible, the mystery 
surrounding Tim’s repeated failure to kill his grandfather dissolves. But 
we don’t find that at all surprising. Indeed, this is precisely what we 
should expect if what we have just done is offer a complete explanation 
of the fact that Tim is doomed to fail. We believe that Smith is offering 
the same account that we are offering, and that’s why we both see the 
dissolution of mystery. The difference, however, is that we are willing to 
call the appeal to the impossibility of what Tim is trying to do “an 
explanation”, whereas Smith (2017, p. 160) wants to leave this open. 
Whether or not this is an explanation, remarks Smith, depends on one’s 
preferred theory of explanation.  
We will return to this difference between our view and Smith’s in a 
moment. First, it is useful to consider a second point of difference between 
Smith and us. While Smith is willing to leave it open that appealing to the 
impossibility of what Tim is doing amounts to an explanation, ultimately 
he does not think that an explanatory question aimed at [EXP3] is a 
question that should be asked and answered.  
So ‘nothing’ and ‘commonplace occurrences’ are both, in a way, correct 
answers to the question ‘What stops him?’—but a much less misleading 
response to the question is to point out that the question itself is out of 
place, that it really should not be asked at all. There simply is nothing for 
him to succeed at—there is no such thing as a scenario that satisfies the 
description ‘autoinfanticide’—and so there is no question as to why he 
fails to do ‘that’ ... I am suggesting that, rather than try to answer it, we 
should reject the question ‘Why did X not occur?’ (‘Why does the time 
traveller fail?’, ‘What stops him?’ etc.) as out of place when the X in 
question is autoinfanticide or some other example of changing the past... 
we should reject such questions when, respectively, it is impossible for 
Y not to occur or impossible for X to occur. (Smith, 2017, pp. 165–166)  
Smith’s view is that ‘why’ questions about impossibility are not legitimate 
explanatory questions to ask. So while one can provide an answer to such 
a ‘why’ question, thereby (potentially) providing an explanation, one 
shouldn’t do so; the proper thing to do is to reject the initial question as 
being somehow out of place. Moreover, it is clear that Smith takes this to 
be the correct response in general when the phenomenon of interest is 
impossible. We disagree, both with respect to the general claim and with 
regard to its particular application to the time travel case.  
We think there is a slippage in Smith’s reasoning between two sorts of 
cases. By differentiating them we will see more clearly that a why 
question aimed at [EXP3] is a reasonable explanatory question to ask. In 
the first case, one knows that it is impossible for Tim to kill his 
grandfather, because one knows that success would lead to a contradiction 
and contradictions are impossible. In the second case, one does not know 
that it is impossible for Tim to kill his grandfather, because one does not 
know that success would lead to a contradiction, though one does know 
that contradictions are impossible. In the second case, it is perfectly 
reasonable to ask why Tim is doomed to fail. Indeed, asking such a 
question seems like exactly the right thing to do in this situation. Denying 
that this is a reasonable question to ask is risky business. There are many 
cases where a particular outcome is impossible, but we can and should ask 
explanatory ‘why’ questions in order to reveal the impossibility at issue. 
A case in point is the Bridges of Königsberg case described above. But 
there are others. Indeed, in any case in which the laws of nature rule out a 
particular outcome, it is reasonable to ask why the outcome at issue does 
not occur. And that’s precisely because identifying what is and is not 
impossible is a very important part of explaining the world. In order to 
develop the best explanatory theories we can, we must limn the boundary 
between the possible and the impossible, and the only way to do that is to 
ask ‘why’ questions.  
In the first case, by contrast, when one knows that Tim’s success would 
lead to contradiction, and that contradictions are impossible, we agree that 
asking ‘but why is Tim doomed to fail?’ is a silly thing to do. But the 
silliness has nothing to do with the fact that what Tim is trying to do is 
impossible. The silliness is just the same silliness involved whenever one 
has a complete explanation before them of some phenomenon, and then 
stubbornly refuses to take that explanation seriously. For instance, 
suppose that someone throws a rock at a window and breaks it. The broken 
window is discovered, and the breakage is explained in terms of the 
thrown rock. If one were to ask, in the face of that information, ‘but why 
did the window break?’, then one has just failed to grasp the explanation 
at issue. In that situation, there is something untoward about re-asking the 
‘why’ question, at least if one asks the question expecting there to be some 
further explanation available for the breaking of the window. The question 
is an unreasonable one, and it is unreasonable in exactly the same way as 
asking why Tim is doomed to fail, once one has the logical explanation 
for his failure in hand. In both cases one is either failing to under- stand 
the explanation, or failing to understand the game of giving and receiving 
explanations. But one can fail in these ways for any explanation.  
This brings us back to the first point of difference between us and Smith: 
we do not think it should be left open whether an appeal to logic should 
count as an explanation. The account we have offered for why it is that 
Tim is doomed to fail appears to have the necessary features to be an 
explanation. First and foremost, it is an answer to a ‘why’ question. The 
why question at issue being, of course, ‘why is Tim doomed to fail in his 
attempts to kill grandfather?” One might seek to press the objection by 
arguing that the account we have offered does not answer a contrastive 
why question, and all explanatory ‘why’ questions are contrastive, of the 
form ‘why P and not Q1...Qn?’ Where the Qi designate some salient range 
of alternatives. On the contrary, the ‘why’ question that logic answers in 
the time travel case can be framed contrastively, as follows: ‘why is Tim 
doomed to fail in his attempts to kill grandfather rather than succeeding 
even once?’ The answer to this question is just that: Tim is doomed to fail 
and not succeed even once because if Tim were to succeed even once, then 
a contradiction would follow and contradictions are ruled out by the law 
of non-contradiction.  
In addition to being an answer to a ‘why’ question, the account we have 
offered for why it is that Tim is doomed to fail removes mystery, as all 
good explanations should. Smith concedes as much: by pointing to the 
fact that Tim is trying to bring about a contradiction, and noting that 
contradictions are impossible, all mystery surrounding Tim’s repeated 
failures has been removed. There is nothing more to be said; a full 
explanatory account of [EXP3] has been given. The logical account of 
Tim’s failure also provides us with understanding of the situation, as any 
good explanation should. When we work out that what Tim is trying to do 
would yield a contradiction, and we reflect on the fact that contradictions 
are impossible, we fully understand why it is that Tim is doomed to fail. 
We can see that understanding is in fact gained by contrasting the logical 
account of Tim’s failure with the causal explanation of [EXP1]. That 
Tim’s gun jams does not help us to understand why he is doomed to fail. 
As soon as we build in the logical constraints and the inevitable 
contradiction associated with Tim’s success, we come to understand why 
[EXP2] is the case.  
Finally, the account we have provided has two salient features that, for 
many philosophers, are deeply connected to explanation: unification and 
prediction. As already noted, appealing to the law of non-contradiction 
serves to unify all of Tim’s various failures to kill his grandfather under a 
common banner. They are all attempts to do something impossible; a 
commonality that cannot be seen by attending to the causal facts alone, 
since the sum total of failures are quite disparate with regard to their 
causal profiles. The law of non-contradiction also has predictive power: it 
predicts that for any further attempts that Tim might make on 
grandfather’s life, Tim will fail.  
The account we have provided walks, talks and looks like an explanation; 
we this think it is one. Still, one might remain unconvinced. In the next 
sub-section we therefore consider three objections against the idea that we 
have offered a genuine explanation of the fact that Tim is doomed to fail 
in his murderous efforts.7  
3.2. Not an Explanation!  
The first objection takes the form of a dilemma. Either the law of non-
contradiction causes Tim to fail repeatedly or it does not. If it does, then 
what we have offered counts as an explanation, but the explanation is 
horrifying. The explanation is horrifying because, if true, then it really 
would seem as though there are powerful ‘logical guardians’ or ‘magical 
laws of logic’ that reach down into the world at the last moment, just 
before Tim is about to pull the trigger, and stay his hand. If the law of 
non-contradiction does not cause Tim’s repeated failures, then it is not an 
explanation, because all explanations are causal.  
We have already made it clear that we are averse to the idea of logical 
guardians. We don’t think that the law of non-contradiction somehow 
causes anyone to do anything. The objection, however, trades on a false 
presupposition, namely that all explanations must be causal. There are 
some, such as Lewis, who have held this view (which, as already 
discussed, is why he wouldn’t like the logical explanation we have 
proposed). But the idea that all explanation is causal has been the subject 
of sharp criticism in recent times. There has been a proliferation of 
examples of non-causal explanation within the philosophy of science and 
philosophy of mathematics literatures.8 Accordingly, without an argument 
for the view that all explanation is causal, the assumption simply begs the 
question against our position. Arguments in favor of the view that all 
explanation is causal are hard to come by. In so far as such arguments 
have been offered, they are arguments in favor of the view that all 
explanation for the occurrence of particular events is causal explanation. 
Philosophers who put forward these arguments tend to concede that 
regularity explanations—explanations for why certain regularities 
appear—are likely to be non-causal explanations. But that is precisely the 
kind of explanation we take ourselves to be offering: we are confronted 
with a regularity, the repeated failure of Tim’s attempts to kill his 
grandfather. The explanation for this regularity lies in logic.  
The explanation we are offering, then, is similar to the explanation of why 
one law holds, in terms of another. For instance, one can explain a number 
of conservation laws by appealing to rotational symmetries within 
spacetime.9 These symmetries are part of the nomic structure of the 
geometric manifold that our universe is constituted by. It seems very 
strange, however, to say that the rotational symmetries cause the 
conservation laws to be thus and so. The explanation, then, is non-causal. 
Our explanation is like this: there is a regular happening in our universe, 
time travelers never kill their grandfathers. The explanation lies in logic: 
it is because of the law of non-contradiction that time-travel events are 
thus and so. But the law of non-contradiction no more causes Tim’s failure 
than do the deep rotational symmetries of spacetime cause the 
conservation of mass/energy across the manifold.  
The second objection focuses on the concepts of unification and 
prediction. Ac- cording to Frost-Arnold (2010) explanations must be 
unifying and predictive in a particular way. They must be capable of 
unifying and predicting novel phenomena, where a ‘novel phenomenon’ 
is (roughly) any phenomenon that one did not set out to explain. So, for 
example, consider the following putative explanation for why it is that 
opium puts one to sleep: because it has a dormative virtue. This is no 
explanation at all, one might argue. Why? Because the fact that opium has 
a dormative virtue does not unify the properties of opium with anything 
other than exactly the thing we are trying to explain. It does not, for 
instance, explain why ketamine or marijuana also have doping effects. 
Similarly, the fact that opium has a dormative virtue does not predict 
anything other than the fact that opium puts one to sleep. It does not, for 
instance, predict the fact that alcohol at suitably high doses will also put 
one to sleep.  
Our explanation for why it is that Tim is doomed to fail, one might argue, 
is just like the dormative virtue explanation. Its unificatory and predictive 
powers are restricted to all and only those cases of Tim failing. The 
explanation does not unify Tim’s failure with anything other than exactly 
that which we set out to explain; and it does not predict anything other 
than the regularity that we set out to explain.  
But that’s not right. The explanation we have offered has novel unificatory 
and predictive powers. The explanation unifies Tim’s failure with the 
failure of every single attempt by a time traveler to initiate a self-defeating 
causal chain. In addition, as we shall see presently, the explanation 
provides a unified account of grand- father paradoxes that arise in higher 
temporal dimensions (indeed, the explanation works for paradoxes in n-
dimensional temporal spaces).10 The predictive power of the explanation 
is also apparent. The law of non-contradiction predicts the presence of 
grey state solutions in time travel cases (cf. Dowe 2007). Grey-state 
solutions arise for physical systems involving time-traveling particles and 
the like. Some such systems can be placed into paradoxical set-ups: set-
ups that seem bound to produce a contradiction. The discovery that such 
systems always have grey state solutions shows that there will always be 
some consistent state for the system to enter into, despite its apparent 
tendency to engender paradox. The fact that there is always a consistent 
state for the system to enter into is exactly what we should expect if the 
law of non-contradiction is true. Notice, however, that the existence of 
grey state solutions was no part of the initial explanatory target.  
The third objection focuses on the link between explanation and 
difference- making. For some, explanation is to be analyzed in terms of 
difference-making (see, for instance, Strevens (2008)). For others, 
explanation is not to be analysed in terms of difference-making but is 
nonetheless deeply connected to that concept (see Woodward (2003) and 
Woodward and Hitchcock (2003)). Difference-making, in turn, is often 
understood counterfactually: x makes a difference to y when if x had not 
been the case, y would not have been the case. Given all this, one might 
argue that the law of non-contradiction cannot do explanatory work as it 
is not appropriately connected to difference-making. For there to be an 
appropriate connection, the following counterfactual would need to be 
true:  
[1] If the law of non-contradiction had been false, Tim would have 
succeeded in killing grandfather.  
This is a counterpossible. As Lewis (1973b; 1973a), Williamson (2007) 
and others have argued, however, all counterpossibles are trivially true. 
Accordingly, on this approach to counterfactuals, the following 
counterfactuals are also trivially true:  
[2] If the law of excluded middle had been false, Tim would have 
succeeded in killing grandfather.  
[3] If 2 + 2 = 5, Tim would have succeeded in killing grandfather.  
[4] If bachelors had not been unmarried males, Tim would have 
succeeded in killing grandfather.  
Now there’s trouble. If [2]–[4] are true, and counterfactual dependence is 
indicative of difference-making and thus explanation, then it turns out that 
all manner of junk explains Tim’s repeated failure to kill his grandfather.  
We don’t believe that all counterpossibles are trivially true. Moreover, we 
are not alone here. A number of philosophers maintain, contra Lewis and 
Williamson, that counterpossibles have non-trivial truth-values. Indeed, it 
is only if one adopts a particular semantics for counterfactuals—namely 
the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics11—that all counterpossibles are trivially 
true. Fortunately, there is a straight- forward extension of the Lewis-
Stalnaker semantics available that yields non-trivial truth-values for 
counterpossibles.12 So whether or not all counterpossibles are trivially true 
will depend on the arguments that one can muster for one semantic 
approach over the other. We have no intention of mustering such 
arguments here. Rather, we will just admit that our view is beholden to 
thinking that counterpossibles have non-trivial truth-values and leave the 
matter at that.  
Besides, there is a more troubling concern in the neighborhood. Let’s 
suppose that counterpossibles take non-trivial truth-values. If the law of 
non-contradiction is false, then absolutely everything would follow, one 
might think. So while it might be true that if the law of non-contradiction 
had been false, Tim would have succeeded in killing his grandfather, the 
following counterfactuals are also true, and many more besides:  
[4] If the law of non-contradiction had been false, Caesar would not 
have crossed the Rubicon.  
[5] If the law of non-contradiction had been false, the Apollo 
missions would not have successfully landed on the moon.  
[6] If the law of non-contradiction had been false, then the Allies 
would not have won World War II.  
As before, if difference-making is indicative of explanation, then it would 
seem that the explanatory power of the law of non-contradiction is great 
indeed. The law of non-contradiction is explanatorily implicated in just 
about everything. It simply explains too much.  
This worry trades on a misunderstanding about how counterfactuals with 
logically impossible antecedents ought to be evaluated. In order to get the 
result that everything would follow from denying the law of non-
contradiction, one must accept that the laws of logic license explosion: A 
∧ ¬A ⊢ B, for any arbitrary B. For it is only if the laws of logic are 
explosive that the failure of the law of non-contradiction implies 
everything whatsoever. We admit that it is tempting to imaginatively en- 
gage in counterfactuals with logically impossible antecedents in this 
fashion. What one is effectively doing is attempting to hold classical logic 
fixed when imagining a scenario in which the law of non-contradiction is 
false. One way to do this is to imagine a scenario that is closed under 
classical consequence and then imagine of that scenario that the law of 
non-contradiction fails because of the presence of some contradiction or 
other. But obviously if the scenario one imagines is closed under classical 
consequence (or closed under any explosive consequence relation), then 
all hell will break loose when a contradiction is added. So just don’t 
imaginatively engage with counterpossibles in that way. Or, rather, when 
one attempts to so imaginatively engage, one typically fails to appreciate 
the scenario one is imagining.  
Instead, imagine a scenario that is closed under some non-explosive 
consequence relation. One option—and the one that we are attracted to—
is to imagine that the scenario is closed under the consequence relation of 
a paraconsistent logic such as Priest’s LP.13 Assuming the scenario to be 
closed under LP is useful because LP permits non-trivial reasoning with 
contradictions. One can, as it were, unravel the consequences of a given 
contradiction using the inferential capacity of LP. And let’s face it: if Tim 
manages to succeed in his endeavor, then the outcome will be logically 
disastrous. A slew of contradictions will quickly follow. But not every 
claim and its negation will be true: claims about the past before 
grandfather survived should remain untouched. LP has the capacity to 
vindicate that suggestion.14  
In sum, then, if we use the right logic to think through an inconsistent 
time- travel scenario, there is no reason to think that counterfactuals [4]–
[6] will be true. Still, one might wonder: what can be said in favour of the 
truth of counterfactual [1]? Well, if the law of non-contradiction were 
false, then there would be ways for Tim to kill his grandfather. That’s 
because the outcome that Tim is so persistently trying to pursue would 
no-longer be impossible. So, assuming that Tim has what it takes, that 
he’s the best person for the job, that he’s a crack shot, then he should be 
able to succeed. The principal barrier to Tim’s success has been removed, 
and the whole point of these time travel events is that Tim would succeed 
but for the paradox he would create. So let there be paradoxes. Let 
contradictions thrive through time. Then Tim will have his day.  
3.3. The Wrong Explanation!  
The third objection we wish to consider denies that the explanation we 
have offered is the right explanation for why Tim is doomed to fail. It 
could be argued that if there are two time dimensions, then Tim is 
perfectly capable of killing his grandfather, by traversing hypertime. Of 
course, our universe is one in which there is only one time dimension. So 
Tim is doomed to fail in his attempts to kill his grandfather in the actual 
world and, indeed, in any world like it, temporally speaking. But there are 
possible worlds in which Tim succeeds. So it is at best an empirical or 
metaphysical limitation that prevents Tim from killing his grandfather, 
not a logical one. If that is correct, then the correct explanation for why 
Tim is doomed to fail is that time has only one dimension in our world. It 
is not, as we have suggested, because the law of non-contradiction is 
true.15  
What is death? Here’s one answer: death is that point in time at which 
one's last temporal part is located. Which is to say that death is the 
cessation of further propagation through time of one’s temporal parts. 
Now, let us suppose that in addition to the normal temporal dimension, 
there is an additional dimension: hypertime. Time can be modelled as a 
line. Time and hypertime can be modelled as a plane. Suppose further that 
Tim’s grandfather is both temporally and hypertemporally extended. 
Which is to say that Tim’s grandfather has temporal parts as well as 
hypertemporal parts. Effectively, what this means is that Tim’s 
grandfather exists along multiple timelines. Now, suppose that Tim wants 
to kill grandfather. To do so, he travels backwards in time but forwards in 
hypertime. He then murders grandfather and returns home. This 2D time 
travel story is perfectly consistent. Tim has killed his grandfather without 
plunging the universe headlong into chaos via contradiction. The case 
may be modelled as follows:  
<insert figure 1 here> 
Figure 1.  A Two Dimensional Travel Story 
Tim steps into the time machine at <t4, ht0>, travels to <t1, ht4> and kills grand- 
father. He then gets back into the time-machine at <t4, ht0> and travels forward 
through time to <t4, ht4>.  
So it would seem that by adding a second time dimension Tim can kill his 
grandfather. So Tim is only doomed to fail if there is a single time 
dimension. It follows, one might argue, that Tim’s repeated failure to kill 
grandfather is best explained by appealing to the fact that our world has 
only a single time dimension.  
The addition of a second time dimension makes it possible for Tim to kill 
grand- father in some sense. But there is still something that Tim cannot 
do: namely, travel to a particular time, hypertime coordinate and kill 
grandfather at that coordinate. In particular, even in two-dimensional 
time, Tim cannot travel backwards in his own timeline and kill his 
grandfather in that timeline. At best, he can travel to a different timeline, 
one that is indexed to a distinct hypertemporal coordinate to the 
coordinate that indexes his own timeline, and kill grandfather in that 
timeline. But now ask the following question: why is Tim doomed to fail 
in his attempts to kill grandfather in his own timeline? It cannot be 
because there is only one time dimension. And it won’t help to add a third 
time-dimension, since even if we add a third time dimension Tim still 
can’t kill his grandfather in his own timeline. The only explanation, that 
we can see, for why Tim is doomed to fail to kill grandfather is the logical 
explanation that we have offered. If that’s right, then the logical 
explanation is still required to explain certain constraints on time 
travelers. Given that we need the logical explanation, however, then it 
seems natural to use the logical explanation to explain all of the 
constraints that time travelers are under, where those constraints are 
needed to prevent paradoxes from forming.16,17   
Indeed, this is the heart of the matter. It does not matter how many 
dimensions of space and time there are: fix an event in that space-time 
manifold (where the event is located at a space-time point, or region, in 
the manifold in question) and that event can’t be other than the way it is 
without inducing a contradiction. As has been noted before (Baron and 
Colyvan, 2016, p. 77) there is nothing special about time in all of this. 
There are spatial analogues of the paradoxes of time travel, except that no 
one has ever managed to get themselves worked into a state of confusion 
over such spatial cases.18 In short, any claim to alter the past by appeals to 
hypertime in the manner discussed here are equivocations. Such changes 
are no more changing the event in question, than an individual going grey 
somehow brings it about that they were grey haired as a child.   
4. Conclusion  
The explanation problem for backwards time travel arises because it 
seems as though there is something inexplicable about the repeated failure 
of a time traveler to perform certain actions. We have argued for a 
particular solution to the explanation problem. The solution begins, first, 
by differentiating between two distinct explananda: why does Tim fail? 
And: why is Tim doomed to fail? We suggested that the confusion 
between these different explananda is partly responsible for the seeming 
plausibility of the explanation problem. We noted, however, that an 
explanation for why Tim is doomed to fail is needed. We offered one such 
ex- planation: Tim is doomed to fail because the law of non-contradiction 
is true. We went on to defend this proposed explanation from a range of 
objections. The explanation, we submit, holds its own. And so we herald 
the end of mystery: there is nothing inexplicable about what time travelers 
cannot do. The universe is consistent and consistency is a serious and non-
trivial constraint. There are limits to what one can do in consistent 
universes. 
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Notes 
1 Although we have identified these three shortcomings of the Lewis explanation 
separately, we have no doubt that they are all connected. The lack of understanding, in 
particular, seems likely to be a function of the other two shortcomings.  
 
2 Note that “doomed to failure” is to be understood as follows: Tim’s failure is (logically) 
necessary because success would lead to a (logical) contradiction. I.e. there is no possible 
world in which Tim succeeds to kill his grandfather. More on this below. 
 
3 See Baron and Colyvan (2016) for more on the relationship between mathematical and 
logical explanations and for a defense of logical explanations. 
 
4 It is important to note that the mathematics and logic on their own do not explain Bridget’s 
or Tim’s failure. Rather, it is the mathematics/logic in combination with various physical 
facts about the universe. For instance, we must hold fixed that there are no wormholes that 
Bridget can utilize to get around the seven bridges, or that the Bridges are not situated in 
an exotic geometry. Similarly, in the time travel case, we must hold fixed various facts 
about the linearity, dimensionality and existence of time. But all explanations are subject 
to the enforcement of background conditions in this manner; there is nothing special about 
the logical and mathematical cases under consideration. 
  
5 The “End of Eternity” by Isaac Asimov (1955) is the tale of such chaperones.  
 
6 Even dialetheists do not countenance contradictions such as these. So even if one is open 
to the idea that some contradictions might be true, there is no reason to entertain changing 
the past as one of them.  
 
7 As Smith rightly notes (in private communication) there are, in fact three views in the 
vicinity and it is worth distinguishing them.  
(a)  There is a substantive explanation: the forces of logic causally stay Tim’s hand. All 
parties (Lewis, Smith, and we) reject this view.   
(b)  There is a substantive explanation but it is not a causal one. This is our view.   
(c)  There is no substantive explanation. This is Smith’s view. There is no substantive 
explanation of the time traveler's failure (beyond the low-level facts about banana peels 
etc.) and, more- over, no such explanation is required. (Smith is happy to call this pointing 
out that there are no scenarios satisfying a certain description ‘an explanation’ of sorts but 
he rejects that it’s any kind of substantive explanation.)  
  
8 See, for instance, Baker (2005); Baron (2014); Colyvan (2002, 2010); Lyon (2012); Lyon 
and Colyvan (2008); Pincock (2015); Rice (2015).  
 
9 See Noether’s (1918) theorem. 
 
10 The logical explanation also unifies other, related cases of attempting to change the past. 
As is well known, the Grandfather Paradox is merely a particularly dramatic way to draw 
attention to puzzles about changing the past. The logical explanation treats all such cases 
the same: the past cannot be changed because given that the past is thus and so, it cannot 
be otherwise. Once put like this, we see that time travel is something of a red herring. 
Whenever things are thus and so, they cannot be at the same time not thus and so. This is 
the case whether we’re talking about the past, the present, or the future. Time travel is just 
a nice way of dramatizing the alleged problem (Baron and Colyvan 2016).  
 
11 See Lewis (1973b); Stalnaker (1968). 
 
12 For discussion of this extension see Baron et al. (2017); Beall and van Fraassen (2003); 
Bjerring (2014); Mares (1997); Nolan (1997); Priest (2002); Restall (1997).   
 
13 LP is a non-explosive logic. In this sense it is “contradiction friendly” yet it has the 
following version of the law of non-contradiction as a theorem: ¬(P ∧¬P ). See Priest 
(2008) for an introduction to LP.   
 
14 To reason fully about time dialetheically, something like the dialetheic tense logic 
developed by Tanaka (1998) may be needed. 
 
15 For discussion of hypertime models of time-travel see Goddu (2011, 2003), Loss 
(2015), Meiland (1974) and van Inwagen (2010). Note that we do not attribute the two-
dimensional view discussed here to any of these authors.  
 
16 One might think that there is some sense in which Tim can kill his grandfather if there 
are n time dimensions but cannot if there are n − 1 time dimensions. Even so, the 
dimensional explanation is a poor one. For a start, it is disunited. In one case it is the fact 
that there is only one time dimension that explains the relevant impossibility, in another it 
is that there only two time dimensions, and so on: it is a different explanation each time. 
More importantly, the dimensional explanation fails in the infinite limit. For if there are 
infinitely-many time dimensions, the only explanation for why a time traveler cannot 
perform a certain action—and there are actions that time travelers cannot perform in 
spaces with infinitely-many time dimensions—is the logical one. Why not embrace the 
logical explanation from the get go? 
 
17 A proponent of the two-dimensional model may well accept that the law of non-
contradiction is a component of the dimensional explanation. She may then point out, 
however, that the law of non-contradiction is a part of many explanations. Indeed, it 
might be thought of as a background constraint on all explanations: all explanations 
presume consistency. One might worry, then, that the law of non-contradiction is too 
widespread to be explanatorily relevant. There are two things to say in response. First, 
that the law of non-contradiction is widespread does not imply it is explanatorily idle. 
Perhaps it really does do this explanatory work. The reason we don’t usually focus on the 
law, however, is because it plays the role of a background constraint in most contexts. 
There are few contexts in which the law is raised to salience for us. Second, not all 
explanations presume consistency. There are explanations in and about non-classical 
logic that do not presume that consistency is in play. So it is not true that all explanations 
presume consistency. This makes the law of non-contradiction non-trivial as a component 
of best explanatory practice. 
 
18 For example, given that an individual is at a particular spatial location at a given time, 
she must have failed to reach a different spatial location by the time in question. See 
(Baron and Colyvan, 2016, p. 77) for discussion of such cases and their relevance to the 
time travel case. 
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